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SEPARATED AT BIRTH BUT SIBLINGS 
NONETHELESS: MIRANDA AND THE DUE 
PROCESS NOTICE CASES 
George C. Thomas Ill* 
Paraphrasing Justice Holmes, law is less about logic than experi­
ence.1 Courts and scholars have now had thirty-four years of experi­
ence with Miranda v. Arizona,2 including the Court's recent endorse­
ment in Dickerson v. United States3 last Term. Looking back over this 
experience, it is plain that the Court has created a Miranda doctrine 
quite different from what it has said it was creating. I think the ana­
lytic structure in Dickerson supports this rethinking of Miranda. To 
connect the dots, I offer a new explanation for Miranda that permits 
us to reconcile Dickerson and the rest of the post-Miranda doctrine 
with the underlying theme of the Miranda opinion. 
Consider two Miranda experiences that seem quite contradictory. 
The first experience draws upon my teaching of Miranda in my classes 
at Rutgers. Among my students, Miranda critics are as rare as the 
honest lawyers whom Diogenes sought.4 I can find the loyal opposition 
on just about every other issue, but not, oddly enough, on Miranda. I 
try deploying the "plain meaning" argument, forcing the students to 
read the actual words in the Constitution: "nor shall any person be 
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 It is 
clear that the Framers had in mind courtroom testimony. Moreover, I 
* Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers, 
Newark. - Ed. I received helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper from Paul 
Cassell, Sherry Colb, Mike Dorf, Don Dripps, Al Garcia, Richard Leo, John Leubsdorf, Paul 
Marcus, Barbara Schweiger, Chris Slobogin, Welsh White, and Charles Whitebread. I also 
benefited greatly from presenting a version at a Rutgers faculty colloquium and, of course, at 
the "Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law" Symposium sponsored by 
the Michigan Law Review and the Michigan Law School's Criminal Law Society. Susan 
Klein provided the most help, commenting on several versions and forcing me to clarify my 
thoughts. Finally, special thanks to Yale Kamisar. The leading figure in the law of confes­
sions for over four decades, Yale always gives generously of his time and wisdom when I 
send him a draft, as he did this time. He helps many of us in the academy in many other ways 
as well, large and small. I should give the standard disclaimer that no one named in this 
footnote should be blamed for what follows. 
1. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984) (quoting 
Holmes' "aphorism" that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic"). 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
4. I paraphrase Diogenes loosely! 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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ask, how can we say that a suspect is compelled to be a witness against 
himself if he answers "I shot my wife" to the officer's first question of 
"what happened last night?" Where is the compulsion? Despite my 
efforts, even the conservative students think it is unfair for police to 
question suspects without telling them that they need not answer.6 
The second experience I offer is that of reading hundreds of ap­
pellate opinions deciding whether the police complied with Miranda. 
If you have read a few, you will not be surprised at my basic finding -
once the prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language 
that the suspect understands, courts find waiver in almost every case. 
Miranda waiver is extraordinarily easy to show - basically that the 
suspect answered police questions after saying that he understood the 
warnings.7 This waiver process bears little resemblance to waiver of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial where the prosecutor is not 
permitted to badger the defendant with requests that he take the wit­
ness stand. Indeed, neither the prosecutor nor the judge can even 
comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.8 As most defen­
dants are represented by counsel at trial, the decision to take the 
stand, and waive the privilege, almost always is made after advice and 
careful thought.9 By contrast, the Miranda version of the Fifth 
Amendment permits waiver to be made carelessly, inattentively, and 
without counsel.10 
6. In a dissent two years prior to Miranda, Justice White said that "it would be very 
doubtful" that a statement would be admissible if the police explicitly told the suspect he 
had to answer questions. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dis­
senting). Of course, this is different from finding a constitutional duty to provide warnings 
that suspects need not answer (and White also dissented in Miranda), but White's concern 
about police creating a false duty to answer points in the direction of informing suspects that 
no duty exists. 
7. See, e.g. , North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); see also infra notes 83-95 and 
accompanying text. 
8. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
9. The defendants who proceed pro se will also have had a rather extensive colloquy 
with the trial judge in which, among other warnings, she will tell the defendant that he has a 
right not to take the witness stand. See, e.g. , Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) 
(noting that the trial judge "inquired into" pro se defendant's "awareness of his rights"). We 
do not know, of course, how thoroughly a pro se defendant understands this right or how 
carefully he considers it. I ndeed, we do not know for certain how carefully or thoughtfully 
defendants who are represented by counsel make the decision about testifying, but we would 
like to believe that lawyers perform competently and that defendants are rational actors. 
10. I confess that the relative ease with which the state can secure waivers of the privi­
lege in the grand jury context muddies my point. Grand juries, however, have been consid­
ered sui generis in other contexts. In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), for exam­
ple, the Court held that courts simply lack the authority to require the prosecutor to disclose 
favorable evidence to the grand jury, in part because the grand jury is not textually assigned 
to any of the three branches of government and, therefore, exists independently of govern­
ment. This unique status probably derives from the historic role of the grand jury as a group 
of citizens seeking evidence of crime in their midst. As the Court has put the common Jaw 
principle: "[T]he public has a right to every man's evidence." Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443 (1972). But no one ever claimed that every man owes the petit jury at trial his 
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These experiences suggest that almost everyone thinks fairness re­
quires telling suspects that they do not have to answer police ques­
tions, but courts find waiver of the right not to answer on any evidence 
that the suspect understood the warnings. Is this really an application 
of the venerable privilege not to be compelled to take the witness 
stand at trial? More is going on here than meets the eye. 
It is good that law does not depend completely on logic. Judged on 
that score, Miranda remains quite mysterious. I wish to identify some 
of these mysteries and offer a new way of thinking about Miranda that 
may explain some of the puzzles. Whatever the Miranda majority con­
templated, my thesis is that later, and somewhat hostile, Courts have 
transformed Miranda from a case about the Fifth Amendment privi­
lege against self incrimination to one about due process. 
In Part I of this Article, by way of background, I outline some of 
the mysteries left open by the Court's Miranda decision and later ju­
risprudence. In Part II, I explore the theoretical and practical disjunc­
tion between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment privilege. Part III 
then draws on the conceptual and historical bases of due process to 
show how a due process understanding may provide answers to some 
of Miranda's mysteries. Part IV demonstrates how the Miranda doc­
trine and subsequent case law is better explained under a due process 
notice theory than under any version of the Fifth Amendment privi­
lege theory. Part V offers some tentative thoughts about how best to 
justify a Miranda requirement in the Due Process Clause. In Part VI, 
I offer some brief comments on Susan Klein's alternative theory for 
Miranda. Finally, I conclude that "truth-in-labeling" - the impor­
tance of which is emphasized by Professor Klein - requires that due 
process theory takes its rightful place in explaining Miranda and its 
progeny. 
I. MIRANDA'S MYSTERIES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
The most basic mystery of Miranda is identifying the full extent of 
the holding itself. As Stephen Schulhofer points out,11 there are actu­
ally three holdings. The Court held, first, that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to custodial po­
lice interrogation. Second, the Court held that the pressure of custo­
dial interrogation is inherently compelling for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment. As to the third holding, the opinion is less than clear. 
Professor Schulhofer argues that the Court held that every response to 
custodial interrogation is compelled unless warnings are given.12 
evidence, or that suspects owe the police their evidence. Thus, the grand jury waiver process 
seems a less apt comparison to police interrogation than the process at trial. 
11 .  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1986). 
12. See id. at 446-53. 
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Perhaps this is true, although the third holding does not necessarily 
follow from the second. It might be that some suspects who answer in 
the face of compelling pressure are not actually compelled to answer. 
This might be so for three reasons. First, humans surely have different 
tolerances for how well they can withstand compelling pressures. Sec­
ond, the inherently compelling pressure of police interrogation comes 
in quite different levels of pressure. The question "what happened last 
night?" might be inherently compelling but it is of a different order of 
magnitude from the forty hours of interrogation, thirty of it with no 
break, that the defendant faced in Lisenba v. California.13 
Third, humans who answer police questions might have 
independent motives to answer, motives that have nothing to do with 
police compulsion as it is traditionally understood. In Lisenba, for ex­
ample, the suspect did not confess until confronted with a confession 
of his confederate; Lisenba said that he would never have confessed 
but for the statement of the confederate.14 While the police disclosure 
of the confederate's confession motivated Lisenba's confession, courts 
have never found that providing truthful information to a suspect is 
compulsion. The distinction is between enabling the will of the suspect 
to operate with more information, which is not compulsion, and over­
bearing the will of the suspect. Like all distinctions in confession law, 
this one can be spun to gossamer fineness, but in Lisenba, the Court 
found that the suspect 
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his 
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost 
his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the 
result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse 
to answer.15 
If it is possible to imagine a noncompelled response to inherently 
compelling police pressure (and the Court has on several occasions in­
sisted that this is more than just an imaginary possibility),16  then the 
narrow holding in
' 
Miranda is less than clear. Did the Court hold that 
every response is· compelled unless accompanied by warnings and 
waiver or only that warnings and waiver are required because of the 
great risk that any given response will be compelled? Justice White, in 
his Miranda dissent, noted both of these formulations of the potential 
holding, ultimately deciding on the former - that Miranda held "any 
answers to any interrogation to be compelled regardless of the content 
and course of examination. "17 
13. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). 
14. See id. at 240. 
15. Id. at 241. 
16. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
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If the Court held that every statement made by suspects in re­
sponse to police interrogation is compelled under the authority of the 
Fifth Amendment, this conclusive presumption would presumably ap­
ply in all situations just like a finding of "real" Fifth Amendment 
compulsion. This is the "strong" reading of Miranda's relationship to 
the Fifth Amendment. The conclusive presumption makes it easier to 
decide when the constitutional provision has been violated, and noth­
ing about the presumption suggests that a presumed violation is some­
how less wrongful, or deserves a lesser remedy, than a "real" violation. 
This introduces another Miranda mystery. The Court chooses 
sometimes not to apply the Miranda presumption of compulsion even 
though "actual" compulsion would produce an outcome in favor of the 
defendant. In these contexts, the Court insists that the defendant loses 
unless he can demonstrate "real" compulsion. Consider New York v. 
Quarles,18 where the Court held that Miranda warnings are not re­
quired when the police are asking questions designed to advance pub­
lic safety. A statement ("the gun is over there") is therefore admissible 
even though no warnings are given and Miranda's conclusive pre­
sumption would otherwise be fully engaged. Although the Court with­
drew the prophylactic protection from this category of cases, it did not 
withdraw the pre-Miranda protection against involuntary, compelled, 
or coerced statements.19 Thus, the Court assured the reader that the 
suspect who loses the benefit of Miranda's conclusive presumption, in­
cluding Quarles himself on remand, can argue that his statement was 
"actually compelled by police conduct that overcame [his] will to re­
sist. "20 
As Quarles makes clear, the Court has over the years adopted the 
less expansive, or "weak" reading of Miranda's holding - not that 
every statement is compelled but that the warnings are necessary be­
cause the risk of compulsion is so great. If the warnings are not given, 
the presumption of compulsion will usually, but not always, require 
suppression of statements made in response to custodial interrogation. 
Justice Scalia in his Dickerson dissent suggests that the Court lacks the 
authority to structure a presumption in that way.21 I disagree22 but the 
18. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
19. Commentators have sought to draw differences between involuntary, compelled, 
and coerced statements. See, e.g. , Schulhofer, supra note 11 ,  at 440-53. Whatever the com­
mon law approach, or the best philosophical approach, the Court today treats all three as 
synonymous. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (using "presumption of 
coercion" and "presumption of compulsion" to explain Miranda's holding); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (using "coerced," "compelled," and "involuntary" in­
terchangeably). 
20. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654, 655 n.5. 
21. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat­
ing that the power to impose "useful" prophylactic rules upon Congress and the States "is an 
immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist"). 
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novelty of the Miranda presumption requires a better explanation 
than the Court has given us. Dickerson explains Quarles with the cli­
che that no constitutional rule is absolute. But this misses the point 
that Miranda has exceptions where the "real" Fifth Amendment 
privilege does not.23 By what standard does the Court decide which 
contexts should not benefit from Miranda's conclusive presumption? 
This we are never told - another Miranda mystery. 
I wish to "solve" these mysteries by introducing a new explanation 
of Miranda. In effect, I argue that the Supreme Court has carved out a 
specialized niche in the Due Process Clause for Miranda-style due 
process. On this view, the notion of a regularized criminal process in­
cludes the right to be warned that no duty exists to answer questions 
asked during custodial interrogation. 
I want to be clear about the kind of claim I am making. It is de­
scriptive, not normative. I am not claiming that a due process under­
standing of Miranda is the best approach to the problem of police in­
terrogation. Nor am I claiming that a due process protection is what 
the Miranda Court thought it was creating (though much language in 
the opinion is at least consistent with this explanation). Indeed, I think 
the Court was doing precisely what Yale Kamisar called for the year 
prior to Miranda,24 and what Kamisar, Steve Schulhofer, Larry 
Herman (and others) have since claimed25 - it was seeking a test to 
22. As does David Strauss. See David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and 
Congress , 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001). For his earlier thoughts on the issue generally, see 
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CH I. L. REV. 190 (1988). 
23. Yale Kamisar pointed out to me that, in the right case, a court might hold that even 
the "real" Fifth Amendment does not prevent coercion, as, for example, if the police are 
trying to find a ticking bomb in a school room. Susan Klein makes this argument as well. See 
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001). The 
Quarles general public safety exception, however, is far broader than the ticking bomb 
emergency. More importantly, these speculations do not alter the reality that the Court has 
never identified, even in dicta, an exception to the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege. 
24. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American 
Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . .  , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN OUR TIME 4-11 ,  64-81 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). Among the many virtues of Ka­
misar's paper is his title. The next year, of course, the Court would fill in the ellipsis with 
Miranda v. Arizona. 
25. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old 
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (1987); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the 
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old 
"Voluntariness "  Test, 65 MICH . L. REV. 59 (1966); Schulhofer, supra note 11 ;  see also Leslie 
A. Lumney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH . U. L. REV. 727, 
794 (1999); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to 
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1838 (1987). Alfredo Garcia ably expresses a 
somewhat different explanation that Miranda was intended to ensure "the continued viabil­
ity of confessions as an instrument of law enforcement." Alfredo Garcia, ls Miranda Dead, 
Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 474 (1998). These views 
are not completely antithetical because the Court might have intended to create a bright line 
that caused more suppressions and yet left a robust role for interrogation. 
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apply to custodial police interrogation that both created a bright line 
rule and made suppression more likely than under the due process co­
ercion test. The substitution of Fifth Amendment "compulsion" for 
due process "coercion" as the relevant inquiry was almost certainly in­
tended to lower the bar and make it easier for defendants to suppress 
confessions. Focusing on compulsion also made Miranda's crucial pre­
sumption easier to justify. It is plausible to claim that police interroga­
tion without warnings is always compelling. It is much more difficult to 
claim that it is always coercive.26 
But Miranda's bright line has been substantially blurred by the 
post-Miranda cases.27 Whatever one calls the pressure of police inter­
rogation today, it does not always render a response compelled under 
the Fifth Amendment because the Court does not always apply the 
presumption. My descriptive claim is that the Court has transformed 
the Miranda doctrine into a due process protection. 
Susan Klein argues that I bend the due process category to make 
Miranda fit.28 She argues that I have not identified a due process inter­
est to be protected or, assuming a due process interest can be identi­
fied, that the bare notice requirement is insufficient to protect the in­
terest.29 While I acknowledge that Miranda-style due process is not a 
mainstream due process doctrine, my argument is that the Court has 
already done the heavy lifting of moving Miranda from the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to its next door neighbor in the Fifth 
Amendment, the Due Process Clause. Other than to demonstrate that 
doctrinal "fact," then, my only job is to find the due process theory 
that is the closest fit. In sum, I argue that the Court has already ac­
complished the rearranging of the due process furniture that 
Professor Klein finds objectionable. Whatever due process has been 
understood to require in the past, it is pretty clear that the Due 
Process Clause is sufficiently flexible (or amorphous) to accommodate 
Miranda-style due process. 
26. I indulge here the standard linguistic and philosophical view that coercion entails a 
greater magnitude of pressure than compulsion. Prior to Miranda, the Court had never 
drawn that distinction in its confessions cases. Miranda was, I believe, intended to be the first 
in a series of cases to hold that compulsion can be found where there is insufficient pressure 
to constitute coercion. See Schulhofer, supra note 11 .  The post-Miranda cases, however, con­
tinued to talk of compulsion as if it were synonymous with coercion, see supra note 19, an 
analytical move that made it easier to find no "actual" compulsion when carving out excep­
tions to Miranda. 
27. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the majority's public safety exception "unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear 
line heretofore established"). 
28. See Susan R. Klein, Commentary, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World 
(forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Klein, Miranda's Exceptions]. 
29. Id. 
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II. THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN MIRANDA AND THE FIFrH 
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
There are, I believe, three permissible accounts of Miranda's rela­
tionship to the Fifth Amendment privilege. First, as Schulhofer argues, 
it might be that every statement made to the police interrogators, in 
the absence of warnings and waiver, is conclusively presumed to be 
compelled and thus inadmissible on the authority of the Fifth 
Amendment.30 On this reading, Miranda is a "strong force" applica­
tion of the privilege. A second possible account is that the privilege 
applies differently in the interrogation room than it does in the court­
room and that sometimes the presumption of compulsion applies and 
sometimes it does not. I call this a "weak force" application of the 
privilege. The third account is that Miranda is a prophylaxis that pro­
tects the privilege rather than being an application of the privilege. 
The second and third accounts might appear to be the same but they 
are not. 
The "weak force" application of the privilege suggests that 
Miranda is constitutional and thus beyond the power of Congress to 
change in any way. The prophylactic understanding, on the other 
hand, leaves room for Congress to legislate provided the legislation is 
at least as protective as the Miranda prophylaxis.31 An example of a 
prophylaxis that is not an application of a constitutional right is the 
Blockburger presumption that a necessarily included offense is the 
"same offense" as the greater offense for purposes of preventing mul­
tiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.32 That presump­
tion is a proxy for legislative intent on the multiple punishment issue 
and may therefore be overridden by the legislature. It is not part of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Court made clear in 
Missouri v. Hunter when it held that "crystal clear" legislative intent to 
punish both offenses rebuts the Blockburger presumption.33 
The "strong force" understanding of Miranda is open to criticism 
for being an ahistorical extension of a right intended to apply only to 
trials and other formal hearings. Other policy criticisms build on the 
30. See Schulhofer, supra note 11 ,  at 453. 
31. Susan Klein argues that Miranda should be viewed as prophylactic rather than a 
"weak force" application of the privilege so that Congress and the states would have the op­
tion to legislate. See Klein, supra note 23, at 1054. 
32. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). For example, joyriding is pre­
sumed to be the same offense as auto theft if proving auto theft always proves joyriding. See 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
33. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). For a detailed look at Hunter, see George C. Thomas Ill, 
Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter, 62 
WASH. U. L.Q. 79 (1984). For an extended argument that the multiple punishment presump­
tion should also apply in the context of successive prosecutions, see GEORGE C. THOMAS 
Ill, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW (1998). 
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core notion that the Court's conclusive presumption of compulsion is 
not empirically defensible and, thus, it makes little sense to exempt 
guilty suspects from police interrogation that would probably not, by 
the Miranda Court's own admission, rise to the level of due process 
coercion.34 Right or wrong as a policy or an historical matter, this un­
derstanding of Miranda is coherent. 
This understanding, however, fails to explain the post-Miranda 
cases carving out exceptions to the original rule. · The best example of 
the disconnect between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment is the very 
first case in which the Court departed from Miranda's bright line. In 
1971, the Court held in Harris v. New York35 that prosecutors can use 
statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant's 
credibility. Seven years after Harris, the Court distinguished Harris in 
Portash v. New Jersey36 when it held that a statement "actually com­
pelled" by threat of contempt of court cannot be used for impeach­
ment later in a criminal case. The analytical structure of 
Portash is as important as the holding. Noting that Harris had bal­
anced interests to hold against the defendant, Portash wrote: 
Balancing of interests was thought to be necessary in Harris ... when the 
attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with the need to pre­
vent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balanc­
ing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.37 
The central difference between Harris and Portash, according to 
the Court, was that the statements in Harris were only presumptively 
compelled. The rule is different when the issue is the "pristine" Fifth 
Amendment: "[A] defendant's compelled statements, as opposed to 
statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testi­
monial use whatsoever against him in a criminal trial."38 Portash thus 
settles the question of whether statements taken in violation of 
Miranda are compelled under the Fifth Amendment - they are not. 
Recognizing this, the Court often describes the Miranda rights as 
prophylactic or "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution 
but . . .  instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination was protected."39 The clearest expression of this 
34. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
35. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
36. 440 U.S. 450 (1979). The Court had reached the same conclusion a year earlier when 
the compulsion came not from the contempt power, as in Portash, but from police interroga­
tion that constituted "actual compulsion." See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
37. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459. 
38. Id. 
39. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). I recognize that the first "exception" 
to Miranda was in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See discussion supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. The Harris opinion, however, did not use the prophylactic locution to 
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idea was Oregon v. Elstad.40 The Court held that a Miranda violation 
does not taint a subsequent confession taken in compliance with 
Miranda, and was at pains to note that Miranda 
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment viola­
tion .... Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise volun­
tary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be 
excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, 
Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant 
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.41 
This "preventive medicine" explanation of Miranda minimizes the 
role of the Fifth Amendment in explaining why statements must be 
suppressed. On this view, not all violations of Miranda produce consti­
tutional harm, giving the Court flexibility to approach issues about the 
scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule as well as exceptions to its pre­
sumption of compulsion. While a prophylactic explanation might not 
be the best understanding of what Miranda originally sought to ac­
complish, or the best approach to the problem of police interrogation, 
nothing keeps a Court from modifying its doctrine. This explanation of 
Miranda, whether right or wrong as a policy matter, is coherent. 
The difficulty is Dickerson, where the Court seemed to suggest that 
Miranda is more than a prophylactic rule or, perhaps, that it is a con­
stitutional prophylactic rule that Congress has no power to modify. 
Given the Court's citation to City of Boerne v. Flores42 for the proposi­
tion that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions in­
terpreting and applying the Constitution,"43 and the Court's applica­
tion of this principle to Miranda, it is difficult to avoid reading 
Dickerson as holding that Miranda is constitutional - either in a 
strong sense, as co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, or 
in a weak sense, as a constitutionally required prophylactic rule. 
If Miranda is best understood, in light of Dickerson, as constitu­
tional in the strong sense, the exceptions and doctrinal limitations 
made on the authority of the prophylactic theory seem doomed. If 
Portash is the right approach to the use of compelled statements to 
impeach, and if Miranda is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, then Harris must be overruled. This analytical turn is, I 
think, Paul Cassell's nightmare. He challenges Miranda, loses, and­
takes down with him the doctrinal limitations placed on Miranda. Un-
justify permitting the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach defendants. 
Rather, it simply assumed that the interests in reliable fact-finding were heavier than what­
ever interests supported a total ban on statements presumed to be compelled. 
40. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
41. Id. at 306-07. 
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
43. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000). 
March 2001] Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases 1091 
doubtedly fearing this analytical challenge, the Court in Dickerson 
embraced the entire doctrinal superstructure created with the pro­
phylactic understanding.44 That language is dicta, however, and it 
might be that Dickerson is the beginning of the end for some or all of 
those doctrinal limitations. 
If, on the other hand, we accept the Dickerson dicta that Miranda 
is constitutional in the weak sense - that it is a constitutionally re­
quired prophylactic theory - the exceptions survive but without a 
theory that explains why the Fifth Amendment privilege deserves a 
constitutional prophylaxis that does not apply to some cases in which 
the Fifth Amendment itself would apply. While that kind of prophy­
laxis is not illegitimate, it requires an explanation. One explanation is 
that the Court is making the Fifth Amendment privilege do work it 
was never intended to do and, consequently, has had to remodel the 
privilege. In effect, to view Miranda as a weak version of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege requires that we recognize the Fifth 
Amendment as having a strong force in formal proceedings and a 
weak force in police interrogation. Nothing keeps the Court from 
having a Fifth Amendment privilege with a strong and a weak force, 
but it is a conceptually unsatisfying interpretation of a single guaran­
tee. 
A due process theory offers an alternative account that avoids the 
problem of constructing a theory of the Fifth Amendment with weak 
and strong forces. Due process requires notice in other contexts before 
rights to liberty or property are lost. Why not in the context of police 
interrogation? I think a permissible understanding of Miranda is that 
it protects the liberty interest in not being subjected to custodial inter­
rogation by providing notice that the suspect can terminate the
· 
inter­
view. While this is a novel "liberty interest," it is one that Miranda it­
self seemed to contemplate. The Court said that "custodial 
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty."45 And the 
Miranda solution, after all, was to tell the suspect that he has a "right 
to remain silent" as a way of terminating the deprivation of liberty 
that attends custodial interrogation. 
This "right," however, does not exist outside the context of police 
interrogation. Witnesses can be subpoenaed, given immunity, and 
compelled to testify consistently with the Fifth Amendment privilege.46 
Defendants who take the witness stand can be fully cross-examined.47 
No "right to remain silent" exists when the "real" Fifth Amendment 
44. Id. at 2334-36. 
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966). 
46. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
47. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). 
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privilege is involved.48 Miranda is so loosely connected to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege that it promises a right that the privilege itself 
cannot deliver. This should suggest rethinking the relationship of 
Miranda to the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Even if we assume that Miranda is constitutional in the weak 
sense, and thus not very closely connected to the privilege, we require 
an alternative theory - such as due process - to explain when the 
Court will apply, or refuse to apply, the presumption or when it will 
create a broader right than the Fifth Amendment creates in its strong 
force form that applies to formal proceedings. Yale Kamisar's classic 
study of confessions law that paved the way for Miranda draws heavily 
on equal protection to conclude that suspects should be told of their 
Fifth Amendment privilege before being interrogated.49 Drawing a 
parallel to cases requiring the state to provide indigent defendants 
with a transcript and a lawyer to handle their appeal,50 Professor 
Kamisar argued that "respect for the individual and securing equal 
treatment in law enforcement" require the state to make counsel 
available to suspects who face police interrogation and to warn them 
that they need not answer.51 As Professor Kamisar put it: "To the ex­
tent that the Constitution permits the wealthy and the educated to 'de­
feat justice,' if you will, why shouldn't all defendants be given a like 
opportunity?"52 If the Fourteenth Amendment helps us decide to ap­
ply the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation, rather than 
just in formal proceedings, Fourteenth Amendment due process may 
help decide when and how the Miranda presumption should be ap­
plied. 
48. The text and history are also inconsistent with a "right to remain silent" view of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. The text forbids compelling a witness to testify. That is far from 
a general right to remain silent. Moreover, Albert Alschuler has concluded that no one in 
the eighteenth century would have thought of the common law privilege as creating a right 
to silence. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right 
to Remain Silent , 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996). 
49. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 4-11 ,  64-81. Professor Kamisar's paper laid out the theory 
that the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the police interrogation room 
and that notions of equal protection required providing suspects notice that they did not 
have to answer questions. 
50. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript). About the only erroneous prediction Professor Kamisar 
made in his Equal Justice paper, see supra note 24, was that Douglas would turn out to be a 
more important right to counsel case than Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The 
prediction was based on Professor Kamisar's view that the Equal Protection Clause was go­
ing to play a key role in deciding how to apply the criminal procedure guarantees. The 
Court's appetite for using the Equal Protection Clause in this way, however, turned out to be 
quite limited. See, e.g. , Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (refusing to extend Douglas to a 
discretionary second appeal to the state supreme court even though indigents are unques­
tionably disadvantaged by not having appointed counsel). 
51. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 79-80. 
52. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 80. 
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On this understanding of Miranda, the difficult questions have 
been, and will continue to be, about when and how to apply the pre­
sumption, questions not answered by asserting that Miranda presumes 
Fifth Amendment compulsion. My due process account fills in this gap 
either by operating as the mechanism by which we decide when the 
"weak force" Fifth Amendment applies or operating as a free-standing 
source of the duty to warn. On either view, it is the Due Process 
Clause that does the analytical work. 
Ill. Is MIRANDA ABOUT DUE PROCESS NOTICE OR "WEAK FORCE" 
FIFfH AMENDMENT COMPULSION?: A LOOK AT THE CONCEPTUAL 
AND HISTORICAL BASIS OF DUE PROCESS 
Professor Klein argues that the Fifth Amendment right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against oneself is the only right one needs, 
or is permitted to use, to craft doctrines that warn of a right to si­
lence.53 In effect, she. claims that the existence of the criminal proce­
dure guarantees of the Bill of Rights sucked most of the "criminal 
process" oxygen from the Due Process Clause, exhausting it of content 
in the criminal context - at least where there is a plausible nexus be­
tween a particular right and the government action being challenged.54 
But I believe that the criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights leave room for the Due Process Clause to work when we think 
about the controls that should apply to police interrogation. 
History supports the idea that due process has independent life in 
the criminal context. The clause derives from the Magna Carta re­
quirement that all persons are entitled to the "law of the land," a 
hoary phrase that has been understood for centuries to require a 
regularized process before the state can deprive someone of life, lib­
erty, or property.55 The Framers of the Fifth Amendment created a 
right to "due process of law" that courts understood to be equivalent 
to the Magna Carta right to the "law of the land. "56 The Fifth 
Amendment privilege is a separate protection in the Fifth 
Amendment from that of due process (the two clauses are located 
next to each other, separated by a comma). Separate provisions must 
mean something different, and when the privilege applies, it does in­
deed provide all the process that is due. But how would the 
Framers have understood the application of the privilege? 
53. See Klein, supra note 23, at 53. 
54. This additional condition is needed to preserve a place for due process or equal pro­
tection to operate in areas when no specific right seems to apply - for example, to create a 
rule that equal protection forbids a prosecutor to act if motivated by a racially discriminatory 
purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 18  U.S. 
356 (1886). 
55. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110  U.S. 516 (1884). 
56. Id. at 528-32. 
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Scholars as diverse as Yale Kamisar and John Henry Wigmore 
agree that the privilege has a different history from that of the com­
mon law rule forbidding the use of involuntary confessions.57 The 
privilege grew out of the concern with the power of the monarch to 
compel political and religious dissenters to take an oath to tell the 
truth in formal hearings.58 Part of the objection to this process was that 
the state could force anyone to take the oath, even if it lacked a basis 
to suspect the particular individual, thus allowing the monarch to seek 
out and destroy its opponents. Part of the objection, however, was that 
the state should not have the power to compel a person to destroy 
himself even if the state had adequate suspicion. In 1651, Hobbes 
stated that even a "justly condemned" person has "the Liberty to dis­
obey" the sovereign when it orders him to "kill, wound, or mayme 
himselfe [sic]."59 From this principle, Hobbes derived the following 
corollary: "If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign [sic], or his 
Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe [sic], he is not bound 
(without assurance of Pardon) to confess it; because no man . . .  can be 
obliged . . .  to accuse himselfe [sic]."60 Here, what is being protected is 
the autonomy of the subject and the corresponding right to ignore the 
order of the sovereign to confess a crime. The idea made the voyage 
across the Atlantic. In 1677, the Virginia House of Burgesses "de­
clared that forcing suspects to answer incriminating questions under 
oath was incompatible with their natural rights."61 
The common law simultaneously developed another principle that 
overlapped the Hobbesian right to ignore the sovereign's order to ac­
cuse oneself. Confessions had to be voluntary to be admissible. The 
underlying concern was not autonomy as much as it was reliability of 
the fact finding process. For example, Blackstone noted that confes­
sions made out of court are "the weakest and most suspicious of all 
testimony, ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises 
of favor, or menaces, seldom remembered accurately, or reported with 
due precision, and incapable in their nature of being disproved by 
other negative evidence."62 
57. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2266 (3d ed. 1940) ; Kamisar, supra note 24, 
at 26-27. Historians also agree. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT (1968) ; Alschuler, supra note 48; R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 
(1990) ; John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994). 
58. See Alschuler, supra note 48, at 2638-47 . 
59. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHIAN 268-69 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 
1984). 
60. Id. at 269. 
61 . Alschuler, supra note 48, at 2651.  
62. 4 WILLIAM
.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357 (John 
L. Wendell ed., New York, Harper & Bros. 1854). 
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If we were able to ask the Framers whether any part of the Fifth 
Amendment was relevant to interrogation of suspects, they would al­
most certainly reply in the negative, asserting that the common law 
prohibition of involuntary confessions would do the job. If we insisted, 
however, that something in the Fifth Amendment be put to that task, 
the Framers would likely propose the Due Process Clause rather than 
the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. They 
would see the latter provision as preventing Congress or the judiciary 
from creating procedures that would require individuals to answer 
questions under oath in a criminal trial.63 If the common law were sud­
denly not available to protect against the use of involuntary confes­
sions (as it is not available today except to the extent it survives in 
cases decided under the Due Process Clause), the Framers would 
probably agree that part of the "process" that is "due" is the right not 
to have involuntary confessions used to prove guilt. 
Indeed, I believe we can push this thought experiment a bit fur­
ther. It would be silly to claim that the Framers contemplated any kind 
of Miranda-style notice of the right not to answer questions. But con­
sider how they might respond if they accepted the Miranda Court's 
finding that, to prevent compelled responses to police interrogation 
(not under oath), it was necessary to warn suspects that they have no 
duty to answer police questions. Now we ask again: Given that this 
right exists and must be located somewhere in the Bill of Rights, 
where would it go? I cannot prove my answer, of course (which is why 
this is a thought experiment), but I am confident that the Framers 
would locate this new right to a particular kind of process in the Due 
Process Clause rather than in the right not to be compelled to answer 
questions under oath. The law that existed in 1791 drew a very bright 
line between compelling answers under oath (a procedure that was 
subject to the common law privilege) and compelling answers not un­
der oath (a procedure subject to the common law rule prohibiting the 
use of involuntary confessions). 
Having enlisted the Framers of the Fifth Amendment to support 
my argument, I now turn to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. It contains a Due Process Clause worded identically to the one 
in the Fifth Amendment, thus extending the due process limitation on 
government power to the states. Whatever else is true about the de­
bates over the Fourteenth Amendment - for example, whether the 
Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the 
criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights64 - one fact is 
63. That Congress has never attempted to require that kind of procedure simply attests 
to the core settled meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g. , George C. Thomas 
III,  Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819 (1997). 
64. See George C. Thomas Ill, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the 
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2001). 
1096 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1081 
clear. The Framers did not think that the Bill of Rights guarantees ex­
hausted the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment imposed limi­
tations on state criminal processes. Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, 
who was on the Reconstruction Committee that drafted the 
Amendment, favored a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
incorporated the "personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the 
first eight amendments of the Constitution."65 He noted, however, that 
the Amendment also protected due process of law and equal protec­
tion of the laws.66 Howard thus contemplated that the incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights left room for the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to operate as an independent limitation on the states. 
As an example of the protection of due process and equal protection, 
he said: "It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which 
the white man is not to be hanged."67 While the distinction between 
equal protection and due process is unclear in Howard's example, it 
seems that Howard found a role for due process to play in preventing 
this hanging. If so, it is a role that is independent of the first eight 
amendments. Moreover, the example strongly suggests a kind of "law 
of the land" rule that black men are due the same process as white 
men. 
An opponent of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the following 
example of how the Amendment would limit state criminal processes: 
[I]f a murderer be arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to be hung, he 
may claim the protection of the new constitutional provision, allege that 
a State is about to deprive him of life without due process of law, and ar­
rest all further proceedings until the Federal Government shall have in­
quired [into the case ].68 
This example assumes a free-standing due process protection by which 
state criminal proceedings can be evaluated. 
The Court has explicitly turned to due process in other criminal 
contexts even though the issue seemed, logically, to lie within the am­
bit of a particular procedural guarantee. For example, the Court ana­
lyzed whether a state must allow a defendant access to exculpatory re­
cords within its control as a due process question, even though it might 
logically be thought to be an issue of Sixth Amendment compulsory 
process.69 Additionally, the Court found due process violated when a 
state's evidence law prevented the defendant from putting on his ex-
65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
66. See id. at 2766. 
67. Id. 
68. Letter from Orville H. Browning, Secretary of the Interior, to Colonel W.H. 
Benneson and Major H.V. Sullivan (Oct. 13, 1866), in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Oct. 26, 
1866 at 2. 
69. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
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culpatory evidence even though the specific deprivations were of the 
Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and to have compul­
sory process.70 
Does due process provide a comfortable "home" for notice that a 
suspect does not have a duty to answer police questions? Consider an­
other thought experiment suggested by Yale Kamisar.71 Suppose the 
Warren Court had decided that it was too much of a stretch to apply 
the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation room. 
Could it have used its due process cases to create a Miranda-like rule? 
I believe the answer is yes. 
In Blackburn v. Alabama,72 the Court held involuntary on due pro­
cess grounds the confession given by a suspect suffering from mental 
illness. Blackburn's due process analysis tracks Miranda's Fifth 
Amendment privilege analysis pretty closely. Both are concerned with 
the ability of the suspect to make a decision based on "a rational in­
tellect and a free will. "73 Blackburn holds that a confession not so 
based is a violation of due process. The piece that is missing in 
Blackburn is a global concern with the effect on suspects of all police 
interrogation, not just the particular one under the Court's micro­
scope. In the next three years, however, the Court began to expand its 
due process focus. 
In Lynumn v. Illinois,74 the Court commented that the suspect 
"was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice 
convicted felon who had purportedly 'set her up.' There was no friend 
or adviser to whom she might turn. "75 Though the police also made a 
threat (to have her children taken from her), it is significant that the 
Court considered the coercive effect of being "encircled" by police 
without "friend or adviser to whom she might turn." These coercive 
pressures would be true in almost every case of custodial police inter­
rogation. 
In Haynes v. Washington,76 decided two months after Lynumn, the 
Court found compulsion without a threat beyond that of further in­
communicado interrogation. The concern in Haynes was the effect on 
suspects generally of incommunicado interrogation. Here is what the 
Court said, near the end of its opinion - a passage that surely 
presages Miranda: 
70. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
71. Professor Kamisar offered this idea in a question during the symposium. 
72. 361 U.S. 199 (1960). 
73. Id. at 208. 
74. 372 U.S. 528 (1963). 
75. Id. at 534. 
76. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
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We cannot blind ourselves to what experience unmistakably teaches: that 
even apart from the express threat, the basic techniques present here -
the secret and incommunicado detention and interrogation - are de­
vices adapted and used to extort confessions from suspects . . . .  [W]e do 
not mean to suggest that all interrogation of witnesses and suspects is 
impermissible. Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential tool in effec­
tive law enforcement. The line between proper and permissible police 
conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, 
a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is neces­
sary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive 
pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused.77 
The Miranda Court could have relied on Blackburn, Lynumn, and 
Haynes to hold that custodial police interrogation is inherently a dep­
rivation of due process liberty unless the suspect is warned that he has 
a right to terminate the interrogation. The Court chose a different 
path, of course, probably in part because the due process path would 
have required the Court to overrule prior cases permitting some pretty 
rough interrogation techniques78 as well cases refusing to find due pro­
cess violations even when the suspect requested counsel.79 As the Fifth 
Amendment privilege had only applied to the states for two years 
when Miranda was decided,80 there were no contrary Fifth 
Amendment precedents to be overruled. Moreover, it is difficult to 
read the Miranda opinion without getting the sense that the Court 
thought the Fifth Amendment privilege was a clearer, cleaner solution 
than a thorough overhaul of the due process doctrine. Now that the 
Fifth Amendment solution has been blurred and warped, however, 
there is no reason the Court cannot reconsider what is the best doc­
trinal home for a Miranda rule. If a due process home is a better fit in 
the twenty-first century, the Court should embrace it. 
Is due process a better fit? One reason to prefer a due process un­
derstanding, touched on earlier, is that Miranda waiver looks very dif­
ferent from waiving the privilege at trial. The Miranda opinion hints 
that the Court expected a high percentage of suspects to invoke the 
right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Had that occurred, one 
could argue that the Miranda protection of the privilege was sturdy 
enough, in an informal way, for rough parity with the formal court­
room application of the privilege. If most suspects say nothing that 
could be used against them later, or if they request counsel to advise 
them about answering police questions, there would be little practical 
77. Id. at 514-15. 
78. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For a more detailed discussion 
of this case, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
79. See, e.g. , Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (rejecting the claim that failure 
to honor suspect's request for counsel violated Due Process Clause). 
80. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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difference, in the total universe of cases, between the Miranda protec­
tion and that of the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege. But that is not 
the reality of how Miranda operates. Roughly eighty percent of all 
suspects waive Miranda, and the vast majority of those suspects in­
criminate themselves.81 This is not parity with the courtroom applica­
tion and its waiver standard. As Professor Kamisar said in 1965, "if the 
privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at all."82 
The Court's language in Miranda could be read to require consid­
erably more to prove waiver than has turned out to be the standard. 
The Court wrote: "If the interrogation continues without the presence 
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the 
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly. and intelli­
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to 
retained or appointed counsel."83 But the whole concept of Fifth 
Amendment waiver is oddly attached to the "weak" force of the Fifth 
Amendment that seems to explain Miranda. Part of what has given 
Miranda critics traction all these years is the incongruity of asking 
whether a suspect has waived his right not to be compelled to answer 
questions. How can one waive the right not to be compelled? It makes 
sense to think about waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege in the 
context of a trial - by choosing to testify, the defendant waives the 
right she has not to be subpoenaed to testify. But because police can­
not compel suspects to answer under penalty of contempt, the notion 
of waiving the right not to be compelled in the interrogation room 
borders on the incoherent.84 This conceptual oddity makes the task of 
fashioning a waiver standard in the police interrogation room compa­
rable to that in the courtroom more difficult, even if the Court had the 
political will to attempt to do so. 
Due process, by comparison, does not require an affirmative, 
counseled waiver. The prisoner facing loss of good time credits and 
the parolee facing parole revocation can waive the right to a hearing 
by simply not appearing after notice has been given.85 To be sure, one 
could describe the non-appearance in these cases as forfeiture, rather 
81. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An 
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996); Richard A. Leo, 
Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). 
82. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 33 (quoting Note, The Privilege Against Self­
Incrimination: Does it Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 459, 477 (1953)). 
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
84. The standard response to that argument is that Miranda created (or found in the 
Fifth Amendment) a right to silence. See, e.g. , R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and 
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981) (articulating and critiquing this 
conception of the Fifth Amendment); see also discussion supra notes 57-63 and accompany­
ing text. 
85. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972); see also discussion infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text. 
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than waiver, but nothing turns on the formalistic label that is applied. 
What counts is that the prisoner and the parolee had notice and failed 
to exercise the right about which they were notified. The suspect in the 
police interrogation room can similarly waive Miranda by listening to 
the warnings and talking to the police. Talking to the police is a failure 
to exercise the relevant right in the same way as failing to appear at 
the parole revocation hearing. Waiver can be found even in a case 
where the suspect refuses to sign the waiver form and states, "I will 
talk to you but I am not signing any form."86 To compare that to the 
decision to take the witness stand in a criminal trial is to diminish the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The distinction: between Fifth Amendment waiver at trial and due 
process waiver becomes clearer in two of the Court's Miranda cases. 
In Connecticut v. Barrett,87 the Court upheld waiver when the suspect 
answered orally even though he said he would not sign a statement un­
til his lawyer appeared. In Colorado v. Spring,88 the Court found 
waiver even though the suspect did not know he was going to be inter­
rogated for a more serious crime than the one for which he was under 
arrest. Do these cases meet due process standards for notice? I think 
so. In both cases; the suspect knew he did not have to answer police 
questions and that he could have a lawyer present during the interro­
gation. That he lacked perfect information in Spring or made an illogi­
cal decision in Barrett does not mean he lacked notice of the conse­
quence of answering police questions or of his right to counsel and to 
terminate the interview. The argument is more difficult, however, if 
one has to conclude that either Spring or Barrett was no longer react­
ing to the inherent compulsion of police interrogation when they an­
swered questions while holding a warped or incomplete understanding 
of what they faced.89 
In addition to the way waiver is proved, what happens after waiver 
further distinguishes Miranda from the Fifth Amendment privilege 
that attends the trial. At trial, the defendant who waives the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and takes the witness stand has "his lawyer . . .  
at his side, not only to shield him from oppressive or tricky cross­
examination which angers, upsets, or confuses him, but to guide him 
on direct examination."90 The Court has even said that "to prevent a 
86. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371 (1979). 
87. 479 U.S. 523 (1987). 
88. 479 U.S. 564 (1987). 
89. One reader of a draft, citing Barrett and Spring, suggested that the Miranda version 
of notice is too thin to qualify as due process notice. Perhaps, but this argument proves too 
much. If Miranda notice is too thin for the Due Process Clause, it is surely too thin to warn 
effectively of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
90. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 13 (internal footnote omitted). 
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defendant's lawyer from guiding him on direct examination constitutes 
a per se violation of 'fundamental fairness.' "91 
When a suspect waives Miranda, the only limitation on police in­
terrogation is the Due Process Clause, the very protection that 
Miranda found unacceptably parsimonious. And in the hands of later 
courts, the due process protection is pretty parsimonious. Alfredo 
Garcia provides a dramatic example of what courts will permit police 
to do once they have a waiver.92 In this case, the courts found a confes­
sion voluntary despite thirty hours of continuous interrogation without 
sleep followed by another fourteen hours of interrogation after the 
suspect slept for six hours. The Garcia example is not an isolated case, 
nor is it in any way antithetical to Miranda doctrine as it has evolved. 
A North Carolina case, State v. Jackson,93 provides another example. 
Jackson was a murder suspect. He waived Miranda and was inter­
viewed for three hours and released; the next day, again waiving 
Miranda, he was questioned and told that the clothes he wore the day 
of the murder were stained with blood, and that tracks made by his 
tennis shoes were found at the scene of the crime. Both statements 
were false. Jackson did not confess. Ten days later, he voluntarily 
came to the police station and waived Miranda; he was shown a 
bloody fingerprint on a knife. The police said that the print on the 
knife was Jackson's and that an eyewitness could identify him leaving 
the murdered woman's apartment carrying a knife. Both statements 
were, once again, false. In addition, the officers warned that, if 
Jackson denied what he had done, they would "go into court and . . .  
testify that the defendant was a black man raping and killing white 
women. "94 Jackson confessed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court 
held that it was admissible under the Due Process Clause. 
Miranda doctrine could have developed differently; perhaps the 
Fifth Amendment privilege contains a non-waivable core that forbids 
trickery and oppressive interrogations inconsistent with the "free 
choice" rationale in the Miranda opinion. The Supreme Court, how­
ever, has not provided guidance on these questions, and the state 
courts permit considerable deception and pressure without finding a 
due process violation.95 Thus, for eighty percent of suspects, the law 
91. Id. at 1 6  (citing, and later quoting from, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594 
(1961)). 
92. See Garcia, supra note 25, at 499-502. 
93. State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1983). 
94. Id. at 140. 
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (deception and pressure); 
Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618 (Nev. 1996) (deception); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 
S.E.2d 749 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (deception); cf. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1989} (holding inadmissible as coerced a confession made after police showed the 
suspect fabricated scientific evidence prepared on the stationery of a state department of 
criminal law enforcement); see also Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: 
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that applies is not in fact Miranda but the law that Miranda sought to 
change. It seems odd, at best, to say that the Fifth Amendment re­
quires suspects to be warned that they have a privilege not to answer 
police questions, but that once they agree to answer, they are in the 
due process soup where police can lie and cheat to get a confession. 
This view of the Fifth Amendment impoverishes it. 
This evidence suggests that Miranda is not really about the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. No, my students had it right all along -
Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to answer po­
lice questions. Once the police give that notice, the basic rationale of 
Miranda is satisfied and everyone is happy. The suspect gets the notice 
he deserves, the police get a statement, the prosecutor gets a convic­
tion, and the appellate court will affirm (as long as the suspect under­
stands the language in which the warnings are given). 
Because the Due Process Clause sometimes forbids the state from 
taking advantage of structural inequities in the level of information,96 
it makes sense to think of Miranda as a due process case rather than a 
case about compelled self-incrimination. But why limit the due process 
notice to custodial interrogation? Structural inequities in information 
about the right of the suspect not to answer questions or to refuse to 
give consent to search exist in a myriad of contexts.97 Why not a right 
to due process notice every time any state actor asks a question of 
anyone? 
A superficial answer, at the doctrinal level, is that this was as far as 
the Miranda Court was willing to go. A deeper kind of answer is found 
in the reason the Due Process Clause requires notice. Here, I agree 
with one of the Court's premises in Miranda, if not its ultimate conclu­
sion. There is a rough and ready difference in the level of pressure be­
tween typical cases of police approaching an individual on the street 
and asking a question, and police conducting a sustained interrogation 
of a suspect who is under arrest.98 Under arrest, in an unfamiliar room, 
How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001); Welsh White, Miranda 's Failure to 
Restrain Pernicious Police Interrogation Tactics, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001). 
96. For example, due process forbids the state from using a probate system that relies on 
constructive notice to creditors when the creditor is known or might reasonably be ascer­
tained. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
97. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that no Miranda warn­
ings were necessary because the suspect was not under arrest or otherwise in custody even 
though he was a parolee who was being interrogated in the police station); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a consent search is valid if the consent is vol­
untarily given based on the totality of the circumstances, without requiring that the suspect 
knew of the right to refuse consent). 
98. Professor Kamisar agrees here. Taking Miranda at its literal word that it applies to 
anyone who is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), Professor Kamisar argued in 1966 that the case for ap­
plying Miranda to stops on the street was much more difficult. See Kamisar. supra note 25, at 
60 n.8. The bright line between an approach on the street and an interrogation blurs as we 
add arrest and interrogation elements to the street stop - for example, detention for several 
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suspects face police interrogators who are capable of relentless ques­
tioning and who imply, if they do not state, that the suspect must an­
swer. This is about as extreme a pressure to answer as interrogation 
can produce short of physical coercion or threats of physical coercion. 
I can adopt, therefore, the Miranda Court's factual premise that cus­
todial police interrogation creates inherently compelling pressure to 
answer the questions. 
My due process explanation does not, however, have to take the 
next step and conclusively presume that any answer in the absence of 
warnings and waiver is therefore compelled within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment. Compelling pressures can exist without causing the 
actor to behave in a particular way. In Robert Nozick's classic account 
of coercion, for example, the last condition states that part of the ac­
tor's reason for doing X (for confessing) must be to avoid (or lessen 
the likelihood of) the thing that has been threatened.99 If that condi­
tion is not met, the actor has been subjected to coercion but has not 
been coerced. '00 In other words, the existence of a threat does not en­
tail that the threat caused the actor to do something. 
Compelling pressures can exist without the suspect succumbing to 
them. We act out of many motives that intersect in complex psycho­
logical ways, and we are differentially susceptible to varying levels of 
pressure. To ask the suspect what he did last night might be, in some 
way, compelling if he thinks he has a duty to answer, but it is far less 
compelling than the pressure that Lisenba faced during forty hours of 
interrogation.101 Moreover, recall that the Court found that Lisenba 
confessed not because of the interrogation but because he chose to 
shift blame to his confederate. The single most telling criticism of the 
Miranda conceptual structure is the assumption that every answer to 
every question posed by police interrogators is compelled. It flies in 
the face of our pragmatic, intuitive view of human nature as well as 
what philosophers have taught us about compulsion. As far back as 
Aristotle, philosophers noted that the decision to act in a way one 
does not want to act is voluntary, in a sense, because it is a decision 
made by the actor .102 
minutes and intense questioning - but the Court is committed to drawing a line at arrest for 
purposes of triggering Miranda. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
99. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 102-04 
(Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972). 
100. Peter Westen makes the same distinction in Peter Westen, "Freedom " and 
"Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541. 
101. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For a more detailed discussion of 
this case, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
102. ARISTOTLE, 3 ETHICS § 1 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Rev. ed. 1976). To be 
sure, the free will premise underlying Aristotle's view of voluntariness ultimately defeats the 
notion of an involuntary confession. Wigmore famously observed, "As between the rack and 
a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is none 
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Miranda had to embrace the pragmatically and philosophically du­
bious premise that every response is a compelled response to justify 
suppressing statements under the authority of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege in every case where warnings are not given. If one is disposed 
to accept that premise, however, it is not clear that a set of warnings 
delivered by the actors who are creating the inherent compulsion is a 
sufficient remedy. Miranda is a glass half full no matter how it is held 
to the light, a recognition of the essential compromise that has always 
been at the heart of Miranda. If the inherent compulsion of police in­
terrogation really compels every response, a better remedy seems re­
quired. If the inherent compulsion does not compel every response, 
we are left with a "weak force" understanding of Miranda without a 
clear account of when and how it will differ from the "pristine" privi­
lege. 
A due process right to notice that suspects do not have to answer 
police questions does not require the assumption that the suspect is 
compelled to answer in every case where warnings are not given. The 
compelling pressures of custodial police interrogation simply provide a 
justification for limiting the notice to that category. Viewing the 
warnings as required under a due process notice theory avoids the 
"glass half full" conceptual problem. It accomplishes precisely what 
the "weak force" explanation accomplishes but provides an account, 
however imprecise, of when warnings are required and when the fail­
ure to warn should not lead to suppression. It achieves what the Court 
now achieves with Fifth Amendment privilege "strong" and "weak" 
forces by moving the "weak" protection into the Due Process Clause 
and thus avoiding the awkwardness of finding two quite different 
kinds of protection in a single constitutional guarantee. 
IV. THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE UNDERSTOOD AS REQUIRING DUE 
PROCESS NOTICE 
The Miranda opinion is itself somewhat consistent with a notice 
explanation. Some of the examples the Court drew from the interroga­
tion manuals do not create what is normally considered compulsion -
the less voluntarily chosen." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 824 n.l (Chadbourn 
rev. 1970). One could quite plausibly array the various approaches to the confession problem 
on a free will-determinism spectrum with Aristotle, Wigmore, and Lisenba near the free will 
pole and Miranda near the determinism pole. For some thoughts on the various historical 
and philosophical approaches to confessions, see George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical 
Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1993) (hereinafter 
Thomas, Philosophical Account]; George C. Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, 
Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 
(1991). Whatever approach one adopts, some gross distinctions are possible - for example, 
asking a suspect whether he has anything to say versus a relentless interrogation with threats 
of physical coercion. Miranda's casual assumption that these two situations are indistin­
guishable for Fifth Amendment purposes has always been controversial. 
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for example, feigning sympathy or pretending to give the suspect an 
excuse for the killing. In each of these situations, the suspect makes a 
free choice, based on the information available to him. What makes 
these routines questionable is not compulsion, as traditionally under­
stood, but the unfairness that comes with making a choice based on 
incomplete or false information. This would not have to be described 
as compulsion. It might better be described as a failure of informa­
tion. 103 
The focus in Miranda generally is on the police-created atmos­
phere that leads the suspect to believe that he has an obligation -
legal, moral, or pragmatic - to answer police questions. For example, 
in discussing how to deal with a request for a lawyer, the interrogation 
manuals recommend that the suspect be told to save himself and his 
family the expense because all the police want is the truth from the 
suspect. "You can handle this by yourself. "104 In discussing how to re­
spond to a refusal to answer questions, the manuals suggest noting the 
natural inference that anyone would draw from a refusal to answer, 
that the suspect is guilty. "So let's sit here and talk the whole thing 
over."105 At one point, the Court concludes, after analyzing the police 
training manuals, that the interrogator's aim is to "persuade, trick, or 
cajole [the suspect)" into confessing.106 
As Miranda critics are quick to point out, however, persuasion and 
cajoling are not compulsion, at least as it is classically defined.107 In­
deed, even trickery may not rise to the level of Fifth Amendment 
compulsion.108 The focus in the opinion is on Miranda-style compul­
sion, a concept that seems more concerned with a level playing field 
and the "free choice" about answering police questions than anything 
else. Supplying information was thought sufficient to permit a "free 
choice," which strongly suggests that the compulsion concerning the 
Court was a failure of information rather than the level of pressure in 
any individual case. 
· 
1 03. To be sure, on a "thick" account of compulsion, one with its roots in notions of 
positive liberty, a failure of relevant information can be viewed as compelling. See generally 
Thomas, Philosophical Account, supra note 102 (describing that account but rejecting it as 
an explanation of Miranda's holding). 
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966) (quoting FRED G. INBAU & JOHN E. 
REIO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962)). 
105. Id. (quoting from INBAU & REID, supra note 104, at 1 1 1). 
106. Id. at 455. 
107. The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of common law voluntariness in Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
108. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980), for example, the police engaged 
in what appeared to be a form of trickery that the state supreme court characterized as "sub­
tle compulsion," but the United States Supreme Court nonetheless found the resulting 
statements admissible. For a discussion of other forms of trickery employed by the police 
during interrogation, see generally Magid, supra note 95; White, supra note 95. 
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To say that Miranda was concerned with failure of information as 
to rights, however, is not to diminish its importance. The right to be 
told what one's rights are before they are waived is part of the funda­
mental belief structure underlying Anglo-American law. Our law as­
sumes autonomous agents capable of acting in their own best interests. 
This entails at least some level of information about the consequences 
of conduct before one acts in a way that causes a right to be lost. That 
is, I believe, the explanation of Miranda's long life. Whether or not the 
Fifth Amendment privilege should apply formally to the interrogation 
room, it might be that our culture believes, at some intuitive level, in 
precisely the kind of notice that Miranda requires. Miranda did not, 
after all, forbid police interrogation or require lawyers. It left the deci­
sion of whether to answer police questions up to presumably autono­
mous agents who have been given information about the conse­
quences of answering. It might be that this is simply the fairest 
solution to the interrogation problem. 
Viewing Miranda as due process fairness explains Doyle v. Ohio,109 
where the Court held that the state cannot cross-examine a defendant 
about his failure to mention his exculpatory defense when he was ar­
rested and given Miranda warnings. The Court found an implicit "as­
surance" in the warnings that silence would "carry no penalty." Given 
this implicit promise, the Court held that "it would be fundamentally 
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at 
trial. "11 0 Here, the warnings create the due process right, rather than 
vice-versa,m but Doyle shows an intimate connection between the 
warnings and the overall question of fairness to suspects. 
As we saw earlier,112 viewing Miranda as providing a threshold 
level of fairness in the interrogation room, rather than ameliorating 
the pressure of police interrogation, explains the Miranda waiver 
cases. It also explains why Dickerson embraced Miranda, however 
tepidly. Miranda was not a candidate to be overruled because, in 
Dickerson's words, "Miranda has become embedded in routine police 
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our na­
tional culture. "1 1 3  Translated: our culture, and even the police, accept 
the fairness of telling the suspect that he does not have to answer po­
lice questions and if he does it will hurt his case. 
109. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
110. Id. at 618. 
111 .  Indeed, in later cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition 
against using silence to impeach an exculpatory trial story when the police did not give 
Miranda warnings. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231 (1980). 
1 12. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. 
113.  Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
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That Miranda is more about due process notice .than neutralizing 
inherent compulsion seems clear enough in Duckworth v. Eagan. 1 14 
Duckworth is rarely analyzed in the literature,115 perhaps because it 
suggests a due process framework and thus is not easily analyzed un­
der traditional approaches. In Duckworth, the police gave the follow­
ing warnings: 
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You 
have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you 
in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask 
you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You 
have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot 
afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will 
be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you 
wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the 
right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to 
stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.116 
The problem here, of course, is that the warnings seem to promise 
an appointed lawyer only if the suspect is arraigned at some later time. 
If Miranda is understood as neutralizing the inherent compulsion of 
police interrogation, Duckworth might or might not be consistent with 
Miranda. Four members of the Duckworth Court dissented in an 
opinion by Justice Marshall that accused the majority of a "continuing 
debasement" of Miranda.117 Marshall concluded that " [a]n unwitting 
suspect harboring uncertainty [about when he could have a lawyer] is 
precisely the sort of person who may feel compelled to talk 'voluntar­
ily' to the police, without the presence of counsel, in an effort to extri­
cate himself from his predicament. "118 
Marshall quoted from a state case holding similar warnings uncon-
stitutional under Miranda: 
[The suspect] is effectively told that he can talk now or remain in custody 
- in an alien, friendless, harsh world - for an indeterminate length of 
time. To the average accused, still hoping at this stage to be home on 
time for dinner or to make it to work on time, the implication that his 
choice is to answer questions right away or remain in custody until that 
nebulous time "if and when" he goes to court is a coerced choice of the 
most obvious kind.119 
1 14. 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
115. A notable exception is Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little Noticed 
Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 (1989) (concluding 
that Duckworth was wrongly decided). 
1 16. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198. 
1 17. Id. at 214 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
1 18. Id. at 217. 
119. Id. (quoting Dickerson v. State, 276 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 1972) (DeBruler, J., con­
curring in result) (alteration in original)). 
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Marshall is co:rrect that, if the principal function of the warnings is 
to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, the warnings 
in Duckworth don't seem particularly well fitted for the job.120 If the 
principal idea, however, is to provide notice that a suspect does not 
have to answer and notice that his answers can be used against him in 
court, these warnings work just fine. However much pressure Eagan 
still felt to answer police questions after the warnings, he had been 
given the requisite notice that he did not have to talk to the police at 
all and that he could consult a lawyer before answering questions. 
Duckworth contrasts quite nicely, on a due process theory, with 
Edwards v. Arizona.121 In Edwards, the Burger Court held, without 
dissent,122 that when the suspect requests counsel, police cannot reini­
tiate interrogation in the absence of counsel even if the suspect later 
waives his rights.123 Putting Duckworth and Edwards together as due 
process cases, they stand for the rather simple proposition that the 
state must deliver what it promises, but it can make at least some 
changes in the Miranda model warnings. The state does not have to 
promise to provide an appointed lawyer during the current encounter 
with the police (Duckworth) but if the police promise counsel, the po­
lice must keep the promise to provide a lawyer during questioning if 
the suspect requests one (Edwards). Viewed as due process cases, 
rather than as an antidote to inherent compulsion in the interrogation 
room, these cases make perfect sense. 
Michigan v. Mosley,124 decided six years before Edwards, reached 
the opposite result when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent. 
The police terminated the initial interrogation, but a different team of 
interrogators questioned Mosley two hours later about a different 
crime, after once again providing warnings and, this time, getting a 
waiver. The Court held that this procedure complied with Miranda. 
The distinction between Mosley and Edwards seems consistent with, if 
not compelled by, a due process theory. The two kinds of promises are 
different. If the state promises the right to a lawyer during interroga­
tion, and then begins to interrogate without providing a lawyer, that is 
a bright line failure to provide what is promised. If, on the other hand, 
the state promises that the suspect has a right to remain silent, the act 
of asking again, hours later, and about a different crime, is not the 
same kind of bright line failure. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in 
Mosley, when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent, the police 
120. See also Kamisar, supra note 115, at 554. 
121. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
122. Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in the result. See id. 
123. See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (making clear that Edwards 
requires the lawyer be physically present at any subsequent interrogation). 
124. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
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immediately ceased questioning. The warnings do not promise that the 
police will never again seek to talk to the suspect, and the police ac­
tion in Mosley thus seems consistent with a due process notice theory. 
We saw earlier that the Court in Quarles held that a police officer 
who asks a rape suspect the whereabouts of a gun in a public place 
does not have to give Miranda warnings. The Court performed a cost­
benefit balance to conclude that the threat to public safety more than 
outweighed the benefit of a rule designed to protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. What is missing, again, is an account of why the 
Fifth Amendment privilege should not apply when a gun might be in a 
supermarket at midnight. As Justice O'Connor recognized in her dis­
sent, "since there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial 
interrogation any less compelling, a principled application of Miranda 
requires that respondent's statement be suppressed."125 That seems 
right even if Miranda is only a "weak force" application of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
If Miranda is best understood as requiring due process notice that 
the suspect does not have to answer questions, however, O'Connor's 
dissent misses the point. The majority's balance of the equities might 
be wrong, but the attack that the Court is ignoring Fifth Amendment 
compulsion goes nowhere. Due process is sufficiently flexible to per­
mit - Professor Klein will likely say "amorphous enough to al­
low"126- different procedures depending on the cost to the party 
charged with the responsibility of providing notice. The Court requires 
actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an es­
tate, for example, but notice by publication suffices for all other credi­
tors.127 The Court in Quarles concluded that the cost to suspects in 
terms of bearing compelling pressures is outweighed, in this instance, 
by the cost of greater risk to the public that follows from requiring no­
tice. This is a starkly due process form of analysis. I personally think 
the Court got the balance wrong in Quarles, but the very act of bal­
ancing the social good versus the value of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege suggests that Miranda has become, at heart, a due process 
case. 
Once we realize that the presumption of compulsion is not a doc­
trinal imperative, the Court's tendency to balance the equities when 
deciding how best to apply the Miranda exclusionary remedy becomes 
coherent, if not necessarily the best policy. Return to Harris v. New 
125. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's holding that the state­
ment was admissible; she concurred in the judgment that the gun should be admitted, though 
she used a different analysis to reach that result. 
126. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28. 
127. See Tulsa ProrI Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
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York,128 holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda can be 
used to impeach. This holding is incoherent if Miranda creates a 
"strong force" presumption of compulsion, but it can easily be squared 
with a due process notice requirement (or a due process mechanism 
for determining when the Miranda "weak force" version of the privi­
lege should apply). Although the analysis is cursory, Harris appears to 
be balancing the decreased incentive for police to give the warnings 
against the loss of trustworthy evidence129 - a balance similar to what 
it would do later, and more clearly, in Quarles. 
The Court also balances when deciding whether a Miranda viola­
tion taints other evidence discovered by means of the violation. In 
Michigan v. Tucker,130 for example, the Court had to decide whether to 
suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered 
through a Miranda violation. On one side of the balance the Court put 
"the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to 
the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence 
which either party seeks to adduce."131 On the other side, the Court 
put the interest in creating an effective sanction for the violation of a 
constitutional right. That side of the balance was lighter in Tucker 
than in Miranda because Tucker's statements were suppressed. The 
question was whether to "extend the excision further . . .  and exclude 
relevant testimony of a third-party witness."132 That balance came out 
against the defendant, as it did in the Fourth Amendment context.1 33 
Physical evidence found by means of a Fourth Amendment viola­
tion is, on the other hand, generally suppressed as the poisoned fruit 
of the violation.134 If a statement is "actually compelled" - as in 
Brown v. Mississippi135- a court would likely suppress physical evi­
dence discovered from the statement. To admit the evidence is to re­
ward the state for using coercion. To suppress the evidence brings con­
fession law into parity with the Fourth Amendment. As to Miranda 
violations, however, the Court said in Oregon v. Elstad136 that they 
have no poisoned fruit. The rationale should be familiar by now: er­
rors "in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures . . .  should 
128. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
129. See id. at 225-26. 
130. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
131. Id. at 450. 
132. Id. at 451. 
133. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
134. There are, of course, exceptions to this derivative evidence rule, but the details of 
Fourth Amendment law are beyond the scope of my paper. 
135. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The deputy sheriff and a gang of white men tortured confes­
sions from black suspects. The deputy sheriff admitted the torture in court. 
136. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
March 2001] Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases 1111 
not breed the same irremediable consequence as police infringement 
of the Fifth Amendment itself."137 
My theory does not provide a different answer or form of analysis 
on the question of whether to exclude physical fruits or the testimony 
of a witness found by violating Miranda. A due process theory simply 
recognizes what the Court has been doing all along - balancing the 
notice violation with the interest in admitting reliable evidence. It 
makes more sense to balance under the flexible Due Process Clause 
than under a Fifth Amendment privilege that otherwise has no excep­
tions. The virtue of this approach is, admittedly, also its flaw, as 
Professor Klein notes in her Article.138 Due process balancing is a 
pretty inexact science. Yet it is what the Court has been doing in 
Miranda cases for almost thirty years, and we should at least call it by 
its real name - due process. 
But my notice theory does provide a more satisfying explanation 
for the Elstad holding that a violation of Miranda does not taint a later 
statement taken in compliance with Miranda. The Court sought to jus­
tify its holding by repeating the Tucker balance: "[T]he absence of any 
coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales - trustwor­
thiness and deterrence" that would support a broader rule of exclu­
sion.139 If the Miranda concern is really about inherent compulsion, 
however, one can argue that Elstad gave the second statement know­
ing he had already incriminated himself and thus likely felt the com­
pelling pressures of police interrogation all the more acutely. This ar­
gument persuaded the state court and the Elstad dissenters. Under a 
notice understanding of Miranda that does not presume compulsion, 
however, Elstad has no plausible argument. If all Miranda requires is 
notice, Elstad has to lose, for he received the notice that was required, 
and then made a statement. 
There are, I believe, only four ways to line up Dickerson with 
Miranda and the many cases interpreting Miranda. First, one can sim­
ply accept the idea of a Fifth Amendment "weak force" privilege that 
requires notice but often permits a balance between the suspect's in­
terests and the state's interest in the admission of reliable evidence. 
This leaves things as they were prior to Dickerson and is the least jar­
ring solution. Those who, like me, find the idea of a "weak force" 
privilege to be ad hoc and unsatisfying have three choices. They can 
follow Justices Scalia and Thomas in Dickerson and insist that the 
"weak force" cases have deconstitutionalized Miranda. In that event, 
137. Id. at 309. The facts of Elstad make clear that the officer did not intentionally omit 
the warning to gain an advantage, nor did he seek to exploit the first statement by, for ex­
ample, reminding Elstad that he had already incriminated himself. Presumably, the deriva­
tive evidence consequences of that kind of police conduct remain unsettled. 
138. See Klein, Miranda 's Exceptions, supra note 28. 
139. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308. 
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of course, Congress can replace the Miranda remedy with anything it 
chooses, and the states can ignore Miranda entirely. Paul Cassell 
chooses this option.140 
Another option is to insist, dicta in Dickerson notwithstanding, 
that Miranda meant to apply a "strong force" privilege to the police 
station house. This requires revisiting, and probably overruling, most 
of the exceptions and limitations created by later Courts. The final op­
tion, like the first one, leaves the case law undisturbed. It is to find an­
other constitutional "home" for Miranda, to drop the pretense that 
everything about Miranda is an extension of one kind or another of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda is, I have argued, about fair­
ness. Its logical home is in the Due Process Clause. If Miranda is 
viewed as creating a due process notice requirement, it makes perfect 
sense (whether or not it is the right approach for policy reasons) to 
have a public safety exception, to permit the use of statements taken 
in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, and to decide that 
Miranda has no derivative evidence consequences. 
The due process option is a bit more jarring than accepting 
Miranda as a "weak force" privilege. I can, however, reduce the dislo­
cation. If the reader is wedded to the idea that Miranda is about the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, I have argued that the Court's "weak 
force" doctrine, in which the Miranda presumption does not apply to 
certain categories of cases, is best understood as using a due process 
theory to decide when to withdraw the presumption of compulsion. 
Thus, whether Miranda's notice requirement is wholly located in the 
Due Process Clause or whether the Clause simply tells the Court when 
not to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda's presump­
tion of compulsion, it is the Due Process Clause that is doing the 
heavy lifting. 
V. FITTING MIRANDA INTO DOCTRINAL DUE PROCESS 
In this Part, I offer some tentative thoughts about how to fit 
Miranda into established due process doctrine. I begin with the 
Miranda opinion. While the Court relies heavily on the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, it does so in a way that stresses autonomy and 
human dignity, as well as the inherently compelling pressures of police 
interrogation. The denial of autonomy and human dignity by custodial 
interrogation might constitute a deprivation of a due process liberty 
interest. 
In describing the cases before the Court, the Miranda opinion 
noted that, "[i)n each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an un­
familiar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation 
140. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Over­
hauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999). 
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procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent [in 
two of the cases]."141 While there was no evidence of "physical coer­
cion or patent psychological ploys . . .  in none of these cases did the of­
ficers undertake . . .  appropriate safeguards at the outset of the inter­
rogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free 
choice. "142 
Still talking about the cases before the Court, the majority noted 
that the "interrogation environment is created for no purpose other 
than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This at­
mosphere carries its own badge of intimidation . . . .  not physical in­
timidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity."143 Perhaps 
most squarely relevant to my due process point, the Court concluded 
that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on in­
dividual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals."144 These 
descriptions of the interrogation procedure persuade me that forcing a 
suspect to endure that procedure amounts to a deprivation of a due 
process interest in liberty. 
The Fourteenth Amendment sometimes requires notice before the 
State imposes a restriction on liberty. A parolee, for example, has a 
right to notice of the potential revocation of his parole.1 45 A prisoner 
has a right to notice that the prison officials intend to deprive him of 
good time credit on his sentence.146 In the custodial interrogation con­
text, the suspect might have a due process liberty interest not to be 
forced to endure interrogation. Even though the suspect is in custody, 
the police interrogation is a further deprivation of his liberty. To be 
sure, the marginal deprivation of liberty associated with enduring po­
lice interrogation is not as great as the marginal deprivation of liberty 
associated with loss of parole or good time credits. It is not clear, how­
ever, that the extent of the marginal deprivation is necessarily disposi­
tive. 
If interrogation intrudes on a due process liberty interest, the due 
process liberty cases seem to require warnings that a suspect has a 
right to remain silent and a right to consult with counsel, both of which 
permit the suspect to terminate the procedure that is depriving her of 
liberty. The warning that the answers can be used against her in court 
is more difficult to justify under this conception of the liberty interest 
that is at stake. Perhaps it can be justified as informing the suspect of 
141. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (emphasis added). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 455. 
145. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
146. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
1114 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1081 
reasons why she might want to terminate the interrogation. Due 
process is, as I have said, flexible. 
A second sort of due process liberty interest is the suspect's option 
to make an informed choice whether to answer police questions and 
risk providing the state with evidence against him that increases the 
risk of conviction. This is perhaps analogous to the parolee's interest 
in notice and a chance to contest the parole revocation hearing or the 
prisoner's right to notice and a chance to contest the loss of good time 
credits. The suspect has both a stronger and a weaker argument than 
the parolee or prisoner. It is stronger because a suspect is not yet con­
victed. He still benefits from the presumption of innocence, and the 
scope of his potential loss of liberty is almost total, rather than incre­
mental as in the case of the parolee and, particularly, the prisoner, 
both of whom are already under state control. The suspect's argument 
is weaker because the notice given the prisoner and the parolee per­
mits them to challenge directly the grounds the state has for a further 
deprivation of liberty. The suspect has to make a more attenuated 
causal argument that this liberty interest is threatened. He faces depri­
vation of liberty by means of a conviction only at a later proceeding, 
where the state has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reason­
able doubt, and where the state likely has evidence other than the 
statement he gave without making a fully informed choice to answer. 
Dicta in some of the due process cases support this kind of causal 
chain. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,147 the Court 
noted that "[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself 
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."148 Given the fre­
quent expression of concern in Miranda about free choice to decide 
whether to answer questions, it is conceivable that the lack of notice 
about the effect of answering infringes on the suspect's liberty interest 
in deciding whether to cooperate in his own conviction. The focus in 
the Miranda opinion is on the harm that would result from a statement 
that "was not made knowingly or competently because of the failure 
to apprise him of his rights."149 If this argument is right, it provides 
ample justification not only for a duty to warn of the right to silence 
and to counsel but also for a duty to warn a suspect that his answers 
can be used against him in court. 
Police interrogation threatens a suspect's liberty in another, more 
fundamental way. One historical explanation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege asserts that it is wrong to compel someone to reveal his in­
nermost self, his conscience, his beliefs. At least when the privilege 
147. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
148. Id. at 314. 
149. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. 
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was taking shape in England and colonial America, religious beliefs 
were constitutive of persons. To compel someone to disclose his re­
ligious belief was thus to "take" an aspect of his liberty. 
Miranda quoted with enthusiastic approval language that the 
privilege grants a defendant the "right to a private enclave where he 
may lead a private life. "150 If the police do not warn the suspect that he 
has no duty to answer questions, they are intruding on this private en­
clave and infringing on the suspect's liberty interest in choosing 
whether to reveal his innermost thoughts. Of course, suspects today 
are not in any way like the religious dissenters of Tudor England. 
Rather, my claim is that we view state compelled responses to ques­
tions as an invasion of the liberty interest not to disclose what we wish 
to keep secret. If the police warn a suspect that he has no duty to an­
swer questions and the suspect proceeds to give a statement, then it is 
fair to presume that the suspect chose to disclose his private thoughts. 
There is, then, no infringement of liberty. 
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment might have contem­
plated a similar liberty interest. There is abundant evidence that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was understood to protect the free expres­
sion of ideas and, thus, to protect the person who utters words.151 A 
colorful example of this concern was Congressman Price's observation 
that "if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his 
opinion in reference to slavery he was treated without much ceremony 
to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon the rail."1 52 Though these 
remarks referenced the time before the abolition of slavery, the 
speaker made clear that nothing had changed in the post-bellum 
South. Others in Congress echoed the concern about the lack of free 
speech in the South. Representative Mann of Pennsylvania noted that 
whoever "went down South was obliged to put a padlock on his 
mouth."153 The South's repression of dissent on the race question was 
an issue of national importance. Michael Curtis has concluded, "De­
nial of First Amendment rights [by the Southern states] was a recur­
ring theme" of the election of 1866.154 The benevolent effect of pro­
tecting free speech in the South appears occasionally in the sparse 
records of the ratification debates in the state legislatures.155 
150. Id. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (Frank, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)). 
151. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 36-41, 50, 56 (1986). 
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1868). 
153. CURTIS, supra note 151, at 148. See also id. at 148-49 (quoting Representative 
M'Camant, also of Pennsylvania). 
154. CURTIS, supra note 151,  at 138. In Curtis's fascinating account of speeches, news­
paper accounts, and reports from the election of 1866, covering fifteen pages, there is a sin­
gle reference to problems in the criminal systems and dozens of references to deprivation of 
First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 131-45. 
155. See id. 
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We can thus accept that the Framers and ratifying legislatures 
wished to require the states to permit freedom of speech and expres­
sion. When the Court began to entertain the idea that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process protected freedom of expression from state 
infringement, the analytical structure centered on the "liberty" pro­
tected by the Due Process Clause.156 Although the liberty to decide 
whether to answer police questions is different from the liberty to ex­
press opinions without penalty, there are common threads. In both 
cases, the one claiming the liberty interest is facing the power of the 
state, and the state is seeking to use speech to harm the interests of the 
speaker/suspect. 
If we understand the relevant liberty interest as a right to decide 
what the state is permitted to learn about our thoughts, it helps ex­
plain Schmerber v. California. 157 The issue in Schmerber was whether, 
by forcing the extraction of Schmerber's blood and thus revealing that 
he was intoxicated, the state was compelling him to be a witness 
against himself. The Court held that Schmerber's blood was not being 
a witness against him even though, as Justice Black pointed out in his 
dissent, the blood was "testifying" against Schmerber just as surely as 
if it had taken the witness stand. 
Justice Black commented that it was a "strange hierarchy of values 
that allows a State to extract a human being's blood to convict him of 
a crime but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers."158 
At one level, there is much to commend Black's view that compelling 
a defendant to bear witness against himself violates the Fifth 
Amendment without regard to whether the human will is involved in 
the act of witnessing. One response to Justice Black is that when the 
state requires the human actor to choose to incriminate himself, it 
forces him to give up some aspect of the human personality, some di­
mension of autonomy or dignity. 
This is a satisfying explanation for why the Court refused to accept 
Black's argument that Schmerber's blood was a witness against 
Schmerber. On this view of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it creates 
a kind of liberty interest in not facing compelling pressures to provide 
answers at trial. There is no particular reason why the Due 
Process Clause could not embody a similar liberty interest as applied 
156. See, e.g. , Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
157. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
158. Id. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting). The reference to "compelled production of his 
lifeless papers" was to Boyd v. United States , 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Fifth Amendment as­
pect of which the Court has subsequently overruled. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391 (1976). Nonetheless, sometimes the act of producing papers can itself be a testimonial 
act (as by implicitly authenticating documents) that cannot be compelled. Thus, Justice 
Black's larger point remains valid. 
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to police interrogation. This liberty interest would likely require a 
warning that the suspect need not answer. 
I have tried to demonstrate that custodial interrogation without 
warnings directly infringes a due process liberty interest in deciding 
what information to provide police interrogators during custodial in­
terrogation. I have also argued that a suspect should have a right to 
terminate the police interrogation, which is, itself, a deprivation of his 
due process liberty interest. If the reader is unpersuaded by either of 
these "pure" due process arguments, I am prepared to fall back on an 
alternative argument - one that least roils the waters of the Miranda 
doctrine. Even if Miranda's presumption of compulsion is based on 
the Fifth Amendment privilege, when the Court decides whether to 
apply the Miranda exclusionary rule, it must engage in a due process 
balance that puts fairness to the suspect on one side and the interests 
of the state in accurate fact-finding on the other. 
I concede that my arguments might not be adequate to justify cre­
ating a Miranda due process liberty interest if we were starting from 
scratch. Nor do I think that the Miranda Court intended to create a 
due process right to notice. I take the Court at its word that it sought 
to apply the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation 
room. The timidity of the application, however, coupled with a fairly 
hostile reaction to Miranda by later Courts, has, I believe, transformed 
Miranda into a due process case. To be sure, Professor Klein is right to 
claim that my theory mixes up procedural and substantive due process, 
producing a mulligan stew unrecognizable in the Court's current due 
process doctrine.159 My reply, of course, is that it is the Court that has 
done the mixing, but that the stew is reasonably tasty. 
VI. . A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT SUSAN KLEIN'S ARTICLE 
I applaud Professor Klein's account of prophylactic rules. She ar­
gues that these rules should be considered temporary place holders 
necessary to protect an underlying constitutional right but "fully open 
to revision by Congress, federal executive action, and state legislative, 
executive or judicial action."160 This account is consistent with the dis­
tinction I have drawn between "weak force" application of the privi­
lege and a true prophylactic protection. It contemplates a rich and 
continuing dialogue among the Court, Congress, state legislatures, 
state and federal law enforcement agencies, and social scientists. The 
social scientists will tell us whether a particular right needs prophylac­
tic protection and the shape and scope of the prophylaxis, and the 
other groups will contribute their expertise and communicate their 
political needs. 
159. See Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28. 
160. Klein, supra note 23, at 1054. 
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The frank recognition that the Court often creates rules designed 
to protect constitutional values, rather than always interpreting the 
Constitution itself, would go far toward creating a legitimacy for 
criminal procedure doctrine that has been largely missing since the 
Warren Court began to expand the criminal protections available in 
state court. Professor Klein apologizes for not being sufficiently cyni­
cal,161 but I think she's right to call for this kind of dialogue. She admits 
to a concern about whether the Court is institutionally capable of do­
ing a good job with empirical data - a concern that I share. The reli­
ance on empirical data, however, provides a more satisfactory anchor 
than mere reliance on the intuition of the Court. Moreover, it finds a 
robust role for other institutions in protecting constitutional rights, a 
refreshing change from the Court's usual approach to the task of pro­
tecting rights. 
Dickerson is, of course, inconsistent with Professor Klein's project. 
Rather than admit Miranda is prophylactic, and invite Congress to 
have another go at creating an alternative remedy, the Court 
woodenly insisted that Miranda was constitutional even though it gave 
no explanation of its relationship to the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
On Professor Klein's account, Dickerson is a missed opportunity for 
dialogue.162 I agree with her, though on my account, the Court owed us 
no explanation of how Miranda is connected to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege because the Court has, in effect, already provided an expla­
nation by moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause. 
I don't claim that my Miranda-as-notice explanation fits perfectly 
with the entire opinion in Miranda or with all the language and analy­
sis in the cases that followed. I like very much Susan Klein's alterna­
tive explanation of the Miranda exceptions. On her account, most of 
the Miranda exceptions can be explained as a sort of collective good­
faith exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Except for 
Quarles,163 the cases finding exceptions to Miranda's rule of suppres­
sion involve failures to comply through inadvertence, rather than an 
attempt to gain an advantage over the suspect. In Elstad, the Court 
even stressed the minor, good-faith nature of the failure to provide 
Miranda warnings during the initial interaction.164 
On this attractive account, the various collateral uses to which the 
state may put statements taken in violation of Miranda crucially de­
pend on the good-faith nature of the violation. Should the police in­
tentionally violate Miranda to gain an advantage, the state could then 
161. See Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28. 
162. See Klein, supra note 23, at 1077. 
163. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
164. The Court noted that the violation was a "simple failure to administer the warn­
ings," to be contrasted with "actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine 
the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). 
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not benefit from the Miranda exceptions. This solves the problem of 
"questioning outside Miranda" that Professor Charles Weisselberg has 
documented.165 
As intuitively appealing as this explanation is, its connection with 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is tenuous. It is hard to figure out what 
the officer's intentions have to do with the Fifth Amendment privilege 
not to be compelled to give answers unless we assume, as Professor 
Klein does, that an intentional violation of Miranda is more likely to 
be part of a coercive environment. But compulsion depends on the 
perception of the suspect, not the intent of the interrogator. To tell 
Elstad, "I think you were involved in a robbery" might or might not be 
compelling.166 That the officer intended to evade Miranda does not 
make it more compelling. Whatever the value of the officer's intent as 
a bright line for locating violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
that intent should be part of a due process balance. Perhaps Professor 
Klein has simply provided a better description of how the Court con­
ducts the Miranda due process balance than I have managed to do! 
CONCLUSION 
It should not surprise us that no theory fits perfectly with all the 
Miranda "data." The Miranda doctrine has evolved over three dec­
ades, often with Courts that were at least somewhat hostile. I have at­
tempted to show, throughout this Article, that a due process explana­
tion of Miranda and its progeny is basically consistent with the thrust 
of the Court's Miranda opinion itself and is a better fit with the pre­
scribed remedy, the waiver standard, and the subsequent case law than 
the two traditional explanations of Miranda - that it is co-extensive 
with the Fifth Amendment privilege or that it is a weak force applica­
tion of the Fifth Amendment that sometimes does not function the 
same as the strong force version of the privilege. Professor Klein's 
theory of the Miranda exceptions is also a worthy alternative to these 
standard explanations, though I think her theory partakes of due pro­
cess more than she admits. 
When I was in law school, the seminal due process notice case in 
civil procedure was Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 167 
holding that the bank had to provide actual notice of a judicial settle-
165. This practice consists of obtaining statements by telling suspects that what they say 
cannot be used against them in court because they have not been given Miranda warnings. 
The police hope to get a statement that can be used to impeach or to find other evidence. 
Here the intentional nature of the violation is manifest. See Charles D. Weisselberg, In the 
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving 
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998). 
166. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301 (describing an officer testifying that "I told Mr. Elstad 
that I felt he was involved in that [robbery]"). 
167. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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ment to beneficiaries of a common trust fund if the bank knew their 
place of residence. At the time, and for decades thereafter, it never 
occurred to me that Mullane could have anything to do with Miranda. 
But that was, of course, because they were separated at birth. Today I 
see the family resemblance. Miranda, meet Mullane, your long-lost 
sibling. 
